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Abstract: This paper consists in the analysis of the corruption in Uruguay and how 
the whistleblower protection could be the key to fighting against it. Beginning with the 
importance of the whistleblower protection to fighting corruption in a general aspect, 
the analysis is focused in the actual situation of Uruguay regarding to the existence 
of corruptive practices, its anti-corruption legal framework and international commit-
ments, the mechanisms of review of the international organizations and how Uruguay 
is not fulfilling its commitments about the protection of whistleblowers, ending with 
some of the barriers that make the fight against corruption so hard in Uruguay, and the 
reasons why improving the whistleblowers protection is the one of the best solution to 
fighting corruption.
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Resumen: Este trabajo consiste en el análisis de la corrupción en Uruguay y como 
la protección del denunciante podría ser la clave para combatirla. Comenzando por la 
importancia de la protección de los denunciantes en la lucha contra la corrupción en un 
aspecto general, el análisis se centra en la situación actual de Uruguay en cuanto a la 
existencia de prácticas corruptas, su marco legal anticorrupción y compromisos interna-
cionales, los mecanismos de revisión de los organismos internacionales y como Uruguay 
no está cumpliendo con sus compromisos en materia de protección de denunciantes. 
Por último, se describen algunas barreras que dificultan la lucha contra la corrupción en 
Uruguay, y las razones por las que la mejora de la protección de los denunciantes es una 
de las mejores soluciones para combatir la corrupción. 
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1. Introduction
This paper consists in the analysis of the corruption in Uruguay and how the whistle-
blower protection could be the key to fighting against it. Beginning with the importance 
of the whistleblower protection to fighting corruption in a general aspect, the analysis is 
focused in the actual situation of Uruguay regarding to the existence of corruptive prac-
tices, its anti-corruption legal framework and international commitments, the mecha-
nisms of review of the international organizations and how Uruguay is not fulfilling its 
commitments about the protection of whistleblowers, ending with some of the barriers 
that make the fight against corruption so hard in Uruguay, and the reasons why impro-
ving the whistleblowers protection is one of the best solution to fighting corruption.
In considering the importance of whistleblower protection to fighting corruption in 
Uruguay, it is important to define what corruption is. Corruption is considered as an 
“illegitimate exchange of resources involving the use or abuse of public or collective 
responsibility for private ends”.1 Both the World Bank2 and Transparency International3 
emphasize on the elements of abuse of public office or entrusted power for private gain. 
In Uruguay, corruption is defined by the article 3 of the law 17.060 as the undue use of 
power or public office to obtain economic advantage, for oneself or for another, with or 
without damage to the State.4
The concept of corruption is analyzed both in the public and the private sectors. 
Corruption in the public sector breaches the public trust and accountability that “fuels 
mistrust in governments” and increases organize crime.5 Corrupt activity in the private 
sector when involves corrupt deals with State actors has similarly negative consequen-
ces, distorting competition and increasing costs. That is why “tackling corruption effec-
tively… requires a commitment from the whole of society”.6
2. The importance of whistleblower protection to fighting corruption.
There are a lot of ways to stop corruption, and there is “no silver bullet” for fighting 
it. The five key actions suggested by Transparency International are: end impunity, re-
form public administration and finance management, promote transparency and access 
to information, empower citizens and close international loopholes.7 In this way, protec-
ting those who blow the whistle is necessary to empower the citizens and improve the 
lack of transparency.    
1 David Schultz & Khachik Harutynunyan, Combating corruption: The development of whistleblowing laws in the United 
States, Europe, and Armenia, International Comparative Jurisprudence (Dec. 10, 2015), https://repository.mruni.eu/bits-
tream/handle/007/14756/4393-9726-1-SM-2.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
2 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank (Sept. 1997), http://www1.worldbank.
org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/corrptn.pdf 
3 Transparency International, What is corruption?, https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption 
4 Ley 17.060, art. 3, Dec. 23, 1998 (Uru.). Translation of the article 3 of the Law 17.060.
5 Resource Guide on Good Practices in the Protection of Reporting Persons, The United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, New York, Aug. 2015, http://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2015/15-04741_Per-
son_Guide_eBook.pdf
6 Idem.
7 Transparency international, How to stop corruption: 5 key ingredients, Mar. 10, 2016, https://www.transparency.org/
news/feature/how_to_stop_corruption_5_key_ingredients  
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Whistleblowing is defined as “the disclosure of information about perceived wrong-
doing in an organization, or the risk thereof, to individuals or entities believed to be able 
to effect action”.8 This act must be made by an individual within an organization, who 
discloses that information for the purpose of reporting and correcting corruption.9 
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) does not use the term 
whistleblower but refers to reporting persons broadly10. The Council of Europe defines 
whistleblower as “any person who reports or discloses information on a threat or harm 
to the public interest in the context of their work-based relationship, whether it be in 
the public or private sector”.11 The Organization of the American States (OAS) adds the 
element of “good-faith” to the definition of whistleblower on its Model Law to facilitate 
and encourage the reporting of acts of corruption and to protect whistleblowers and 
witnesses.12
The motivation of the whistleblower should be the desire to expose the wrongdoing 
within its organization and no other purposes as revenge or simply to embarrass ano-
ther person13 who did not commit any illegal activity. And although it is sometimes 
impossible nor desirable, the goal is to do it as a last resort, after checking all the internal 
controls that the organization has to report or correct the inappropriate behavior.14 
The importance of whistleblowers in the fight against corruption is critical, becau-
se corruption is notoriously secretive, and insiders are among the few people capable 
to detect and report those activities.15 But, to encourage the reporting, it is necessary 
to have an effective whistleblower protection regulation, not only to protect those 
whistleblowers against retaliations but also to give them confidence about the repor-
ting procedures.16
The best way to encourage and facilitate whistleblowing is by providing not only 
effective legal protection but also clear guidance, step by step, on reporting procedures 
8 Transparency international, Policy Position 01/2010:  Whistleblowing: an effective tool in the fight against corruption, Jan. 
1, 2010, https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/policy_position_01_2010_whistleblowing_an_effecti-
ve_tool_in_the_fight_again  
9 David Schultz & Khachik Harutynunyan, Combating corruption: The development of whistleblowing laws in the United 
States, Europe, and Armenia, International Comparative Jurisprudence (Dec. 10, 2015). 
10 Resource Guide on Good Practices in the Protection of Reporting Persons, The United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, New York, Aug. 2015, http://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/Publications/2015/15-04741_Per-
son_Guide_eBook.pdf 
11 Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec (2014)7 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the protec-
tion of whistleblowers,  https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=2188855&Site=CM 
12 Defines “Good-faith whistleblower” as “any person who informs the competent authority of the commission of an 
act which that person considers could be an act of corruption that is liable for administrative and/or criminal investiga-
tion, http://www.oas.org/juridico/PDFs/model_law_reporting.pdf 
13 David Schultz & Khachik Harutynunyan, Combating corruption: The development of whistleblowing laws in the United 
States, Europe, and Armenia, International Comparative Jurisprudence (Dec. 10, 2015).
14 Idem.
15 Transparency international, Policy Position 01/2010:  Whistleblowing: an effective tool in the fight against corruption, Jan. 1, 
2010
16 OECD, CleanGovBiz, Whistleblower protection: encouraging reporting, Jul. 2012, https://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/
toolkit/50042935.pdf  
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to the competent authorities.17 The whistleblower needs to know exactly which steps he 
needs to take in order to report efficiently the corrupt activity.
3. Anti-Corruption framework in Uruguay18
Corruption, including domestic and foreign bribery, abuse of power, trafficking of 
information, trading in influence and embezzlement, is criminalized in the Uruguayan 
Criminal Code. The Government went further and approved a law against corruption in 
the public sector in 1998. The acceptance of a bribe by a public officer, and the promise 
or offer of a bribe to a public officer are deemed as felonies under Uruguay’s penal code. 
Some high-level Uruguayan officials from the executive, parliament, and judiciary bran-
ches have been prosecuted for corruption in recent years.
Laws 17.835, 18.494 and 19.355 (passed in 2004, 2009, and 2015, respectively) establish 
a framework against money laundering and terrorism finance and include corruption as 
a preceding crime. Money laundering is penalized with sentences of up to ten years and 
it applies to Uruguayans living inside the country and abroad. Prosecutions have been 
gradually increasing since 2005.19
Law 18.485 of 2009 regulates political parties and obliges all political parties and can-
didate lists competing in national elections to declare their income and expenditures. 
According to the law, political parties receive public funding for their regular activities 
as well as during elections. However, the Parliament is studying a modification of this 
law which will prohibit the anonymous donations and by corporations, the donations 
must be in an electronic method (elimination of cash donations) as the Financial Inclu-
sion law indicates, and there are going to be limits to personal donations.
However, the electoral courts lack the necessary human and technical resources to 
efficiently verify the financial statements of political parties. Research conducted by 
journalists also shows that the electoral court has not controlled or sanctioned politi-
cal parties according to the law. They also found that loopholes in the current legal 
framework allow political parties to continue receiving donations from companies that 
have contracts with the public administration in circumvention with the law.
With respect to transparency laws, the law 18.381 of 2008 regulates the right of access 
to public information. It includes provisions regarding the processing of information 
requests and covers obligations concerning the proactive disclosure by state bodies. It 
also establishes that public institutions must respond to access to information requests 
within 20 days, providing a reason if the information request is denied.
17 G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan, Protection of whistleblowers. Study on Whistleblower protection frameworks, compen-
dium of best practices and guiding principles for legislation, May. 12-13, 2010, https://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/anti-co-
rruption/48972967.pdf  
18 Information taken from: U.S. Department of State, Uruguay Investment Climate Statement, May. 2015, https://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/241998.pdf and Transparency International, Uruguay: Overview of Corruption and An-
ti-Corruption, May. 2016, https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/uruguay_overview_of_corruption_and_
anti_corruption 
19 More detailed information on legislation and cases is available at: https://www.presidencia.gub.uy/antilavado/
inicio/ 
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In general, the exceptions to the right of access are consistent with international stan-
dards and include information related to national security, privacy, and legitimate com-
mercial and other economic interests.
The law, however, also contains a general provision that right to information can be 
denied if the information is considered confidential, which is too broad and subjected 
to personal discretion. In 2015, Rodriguez and Rossel20 analyzed the implementation 
of the access to information law by doing a mystery shopping exercise after surveying 
journalist who had made such request. The result show that improvement in the imple-
mentation of the law are required because only 17.2 percent (55 out of the 320 requests 
filled) of requests to access information filled were answered in a satisfactory manner.
The Transparency and Public Ethics Committee (http://www.jutep.gub.uy/) is the 
government office responsible for combating public sector corruption. The government 
does not encourage nor discourage private companies in establishing internal codes of 
conduct. There are no mayor NGOs involved in investigating corruption.
4. International Commitments
Uruguay has been party to the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IA-
CAC) since 1998 and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) sin-
ce 2007.
4.1. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
Article III of the IACAC obligates the Member States to consider applying several 
measures for the purposes set forth in the Article II. In numeral 8, the Member States 
agree to apply measures to create, maintain and strengthen “Systems for protecting public 
servants and private citizens who, in good faith, report acts of corruption, including protection of 
their identities, in accordance with their Constitutions and the basic principles of their domestic 
legal systems”.
On 21 March, 2013, representatives of the 31 states that make up the Mechanism for 
Follow-Up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corrup-
tion (MESICIC) approved by consensus the “Model Law to Facilitate and Encourage 
the Reporting of Acts of Corruption and to Protect Whistleblowers and Witnesses” that 
emerged from a broad participatory process headed by the Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS) Department of Legal Cooperation, as part of its commitment to make 
available to States efficient and effective tools to support them in the task of properly 
implementing the Inter-American Convention against Corruption on its legal and ins-
titutional regimes.21
20 R. Piñeiro Rodriguez & C. Rossel, Acceso a información pública en Uruguay: normativa, condiciones de aplicación y enfor-
cement, Jan. 2015,  http://www.icso.cl/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Pi%C3%B1eiro-y-Rossel.-Acceso-de-informaci%-
C3%B3n-p%C3%BAblica-en-Uruguay.pdf 
21 Whistleblowing International Network, Model Law to Protect Whistleblowers & Witnesses, https://whistleblowingne-
twork.org/other-resources/the-americas/model-law-to-protect-whistleblowers-witnesses/ 
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The Model Law provides a set of provisions for states to have systems of protection 
for public officials and private citizens who report acts of corruption, including the pro-
tection of their identities, as provided by the OAS Convention against Corruption. It 
distinguishes the acts between those which have administrative nature and those which 
have criminal nature, giving the competence of receiving the complaints to different au-
thorities – the agency responsible for administrative oversight of the civil service on the 
first case and the Office of the Public Prosecutor on the second.22
Article 4 of the Model Law states that the protective measures will not be granted to 
“those reporting or providing information in bad faith” and “those providing information ob-
tained through violation of fundamental rights”. It is important to clarify that the definition 
given by the Model Law of bad-faith whistleblowing is “the act of providing the competent 
authority with information on an act of corruption, knowing that said acts have not been commi-
tted, or with falsified evidence or about their commission, in order for an administrative and/or 
criminal investigation process to be opened”.23 
The Model Law regulates in its Chapter II the “Facilitation and incentives for repor-
ting acts of Corruption”. Every whistleblower that report an act of corruption is entitles 
to basic protective measures and may request for additional protective measures. The 
basic measures are “Legal advice for matters related to their report” and “The confiden-
tiality of their identities pursuant to Article 11” which states that the reports could be 
filed anonymously and if any of the persons involved in processing anonymous reports 
discloses any information will be administrative, civil, and/or criminally liable.
The additional protection measures can be exceptionally given to the whistleblower 
upon request, after proving that “there is deemed to be a real potential danger to, or 
vulnerability of, the physical and/or psychological integrity of the whistleblower or that 
of his or her family group”. There is a hole chapter about the requesting and granting 
additional protective measures, which can be: police protection; change of residence or 
concealment of whereabouts; medical or psychological assistance; transfer of adminis-
trative unit within the agency; change of workplace; and paid leave.
The Model Law is a really useful guide because it regulates all the procedures of the 
reporting, investigation, protection of the whistleblowers, and the rights and obligations 
of all the parties involved.  
4.2. United Nations Convention Against Corruption
The UNCAC states in its article 33 that “Each State Party shall consider incorporating 
into its domestic legal system appropriate measures to provide protection against any unjustified 
treatment for any person who reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent 
authorities any facts concerning offences established in accordance with this Convention.”
22 Article 3, Model Law to facilitate and encourage the reporting of acts of Corruption and to protect whistleblowers 
and witnesses, OEA/Ser.L/SG/MESICIC/doc.345/12 rev. 2, Mar, 22, 2013.
23 Arts. 2 and 4, Model Law to facilitate and encourage the reporting of acts of Corruption and to protect whistleblowers 
and witnesses, OEA/Ser.L/SG/MESICIC/doc.345/12 rev. 2, Mar, 22, 2013.
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Article 33 is not about witness protection, which is covered by Article 32. The Tech-
nical Guide24 explains that, although is a non-mandatory provision, States may wish to 
keep it in mind because it is a provision intended to “cover those individuals who may 
possess information which is not of such detail to constitute evidence in the legal sense 
of the word”. It applies to those cases that are in an early stage of a case and are “likely 
to constitute an indication of wrongdoing. 
The Legislative Guide25 says that article 33 requires that “State parties consider incor-
porating into their domestic legal system appropriate measures to provide protection 
against any unjustified treatment of any person who reports in good faith”. These me-
asures may include: career protection, provision of psychological support, institutional 
recognition of reporting, transfer within the same organization, and relocation to a di-
fferent organization. The reports must be “in good faith, on reasonable grounds and to 
appropriate authorities”.
5. Conventions Review
5.1.  The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption Mechanism for Follow-Up 
(MESICIC)
The Mechanism for Follow-Up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Conven-
tion against Corruption (MESICIC) is an inter-governmental body established within the 
framework of the OAS. It supports the States Parties in the implementation of the provi-
sions of the Convention through a process of reciprocal evaluation, based on conditions of 
equality among the states. In this mechanism, recommendations are formulated with res-
pect to those areas in which there are legal gaps or in which further progress is necessary.26
The Mechanism for Follow-up on the implementation of the Inter-American Con-
ventions Against Corruption (MESICIC) adopted at March 21, 2016, plenary session the 
final report of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay (fifth round)27. Under chapter 2, Systems 
for protecting public servants and private citizens who, in good faith, report acts of corruption 
(article III (8) of the Convention), it analyzed the government’s follow-up to the implemen-
tation of the recommendations formulated in the second and third round.28
The new developments that showed Uruguay in the implementation of this measure 
is the Article 8 of Law 18.494 of June 11, 201929 which provides protection measures for 
those witnesses that act as experts and collaborators in proceeding that fall under the 
Specialized Magistrates and Prosecutors on Organized Crime. The New Criminal Code 
24 Technical Guide to The United Nations Convention Against Corruption, New York, 2009. https://www.unodc.org/
documents/corruption/Technical_Guide_UNCAC.pdf 
25 Legislative Guide For The Implementation Of The United Nations Convention Against Corruption, New York, 2006, 
https://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/CoC_LegislativeGuide.pdf 
26 https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/mesicic_intro_en.htm
27 OEA/Ser.L.SG/MESICIC/doc.459/15 rev. 4, Mar. 11, 2016, http://www.oas.org/juridico/pdfs/mesicic5_ury_fi-
nal_en.pdf 
28 Idem, pag. 38.
29 Law 18.494 of June 11, 2009, http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/leyes/AccesoTextoLey.asp?Ley=18494&Anchor 
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of Procedure also sets out norms that place the responsibility of protection of whistle-
blowers, victims and witnesses to prosecutors. The problem is, as noted by the Commi-
ttee, that the protection measures are applicable in very limited cases, for example, the 
cases which involve an amount greater than $20,000 US Dollars and only those cases of 
corruption against public administration that occur within the Departments of Montevi-
deo and Canelones.30
Measure a) suggested by the Committee required additional attention to strengthen 
mechanism for protection of identity of whistleblowers. In the report the Committee also notes 
that there are no provisions in place, administratively, to protect the identity of public 
servants that must report any irregularities or corrupt practices, especially in cases whe-
re it may involve their superiors. And a public servant may only seek protective measu-
res in the agency they work in, which may discourage reporting acts of corruption if it 
involves a public servant’s superior, and there are no measures in place to protect his or 
her identity.31
Also, in the Response to the Questionnaire, the Government of Uruguay stated that if 
a whistleblower is a public servant, it is difficult to maintain his or her identity confiden-
tial in the agency where this person is employed due to risk of filtration of information, 
and it would be advisable to transfer this person to another office or agency.32
The Committee believed that measure a) should be reformulated, as there were no 
legal provisions that protect the identity of public servants and recommended again to 
establish administrative protection measures that protect the identity of public servants that must 
report any irregularities or corrupt practices. (Recommendation 2.3.1).
Other recommendations of the Committee were establishing a body that has the com-
petence to receive and respond to requests for administrative protection measures, as 
well as promoting the provision of the necessary measures of protection, remediation, 
and sanctions in the event retaliation does occur and provide this entrusted body with 
necessary resources and personnel to carry out its functions. (Recommendations 2.3.4 
and 2.3.5).33
The Committee concludes that the Oriental Republic of Uruguay did not provide in-
formation on new developments for the provision of the Convention on systems for pro-
tecting public servants and private citizens who, in good faith, report acts of corruption.34 
5.2. The UN Convention Against Corruption Implementation Review Mechanism 
(IRM)
The Implementation Review Mechanism (IRM) is a peer review process that assists 
States parties to effectively implement the Convention. In accordance with the terms 
30 OEA/Ser.L.SG/MESICIC/doc.459/15 rev. 4, Mar. 11, 2016, pag. 44.
31 Idem.
32 Idem.
33 Idem.
34 Idem.
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of reference, each State party is reviewed by two peers - one from the same regional 
group - which are selected by a drawing of lots at the beginning of each year of the re-
view cycle. The functioning and the performance of the IRM is guided and overseen by 
the Implementation Review Group, an open-ended intergovernmental group of States 
parties which is a subsidiary body of the CoSP and was created together with the IRM 
in Resolution 3/1.35
The examination of the application of the Convention by Uruguay was made by ex-
perts from Argentina and Brazil in the period between 2010 and 2015. As similarly noted 
in the MESISIC, in the IRM examination was noted that the protection to whistleblowers 
is “limited in practice to specialized courts with limited territorial jurisdiction and that 
the country has also identified technical assistance needs in this area”.36
6. Barriers and Solutions
The main barriers to solve the problem of corruption in Uruguay are the culture and 
the lack of resources. While analyzing these barriers it is important to take in considera-
tion that Uruguay is a very small country of an estimated population of 3.47 million37.
The Uruguayan culture is a culture of nepotism and cronyism, maybe because there is 
a perceived need to help friends and family or maybe because people want to create their 
own “comfortable” work environment. Recent examples show this at the government 
level: The President of Uruguay, Tabaré Vazquez, ceased his son’s father-in-law from 
his Security Service team after the Public Ethics and Transparency organism (JUTEP) 
recommended it38; One month before that, the President removed the Board of Directors 
of the State Administration of Health Services (ASSE) after the Vice-president, Mauricio 
Ardus, hired his son’s girlfriend; In 2015, the Minister of Economy, Danilo Astori, hired 
his wife as an assistant39; The Social Prevision Bank President and Vice-president have 
both their couples working at the public organism40; Adriana Peña, the Governor of La-
valleja was criticized when tried to raise the salary to her actual couple who worked as 
director of the Department41; and more. 
Also, blowing the whistle about any wrongdoing is seen as a bad thing and people 
learn that at very young ages. The consequences generated by this culture are the exis-
tence of chains of wrongdoings covered by the people involved in the illegal activity and 
by their co-workers, who remain silent to avoid getting in “trouble”.
35 United Nations, CAC/COSP/IRG/I/2/1/Add.31, Oct. 4, 2014, http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UN-
CAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/ExecutiveSummaries/V1406657e.pdf 
36 Idem.
37 http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/uruguay-population/ 
38 https://www.elobservador.com.uy/con-criticas-la-jutep-vazquez-ceso-su-consuegro-del-servicio-seguridad-presi-
dencial-n1179568 
39 https://www.elobservador.com.uy/astori-contrato-el-ministerio-su-pareja-es-etico-es-legal-n304618 
40 https://www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/parejas-presidente-vice-bps-directorio-ente.html 
41 https://www.elobservador.com.uy/adriana-pena-quiso-subir-salario-su-pareja-y-otros-directores-pero-la-jun-
ta-lo-impidio-n1157486 
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Other important participants of these chains are the political parties. These organiza-
tions help their members by covering their illegal activities, not only because of the bad 
press for the individuals involved but also for themselves. In small countries in which all 
people know each other there is almost no place to go after being convicted of a corrup-
tion crime, that is why people cover each other’s wrongdoings and sometimes benefit 
from it (asking for money or votes).
An example of this is the recent investigations to the State Administration of Health 
Services (ASSE), carry out by an Investigative Commission of the Parliament, becau-
se of the discovery of several corruptive activities. The State Administration of Health 
Services’ board of Directors and other public officials (all members of the Government 
political party, “El Frente Amplio”) were being investigated for corruptive activities 
such as owning companies that contracted directly with the public administration. The 
Investigative Commission wanted to extend the term given to the investigation, but the 
House of Representatives did not approve the extension. This action appears to have the 
intention to hide the corruptive activities held by their political party piers.
However, it is the traditional “political competition” inside and outside the political 
parties that helps in some cases to prevent corruptive practices inside the government. 
But it is not enough.42 Countries need whistleblowers that are in the daily operations of 
the public administrations in order to get more and better evidence of the wrongdoings. 
The other barrier is the lack of resources. There is not enough money to waste in the 
implementation or improvement of new or existing technics to fight against corruption. 
In a country where the policemen are underpaid43, and the violence is growing fast44, 
there is no money or time to waste in solving corruption. And wasting money to uncover 
public officials’ wrongdoings is not in the government’s agenda, as it is shown by the 
example of ASSE.
The solutions are very difficult to implement because of the strong barriers discussed. 
There have been a lot of improvements in regulating the whistleblower protection at the 
criminal law level, although the practical applications are not so clear. But the real lack 
of regulation is at the administrative level. As noted by the civil society group “Uruguay 
Transparente”45, all the corruption allegations made by public officials start at the admi-
nistrative level, and there are no effective regulations to protect their identity and their 
job positions after eventual retaliations. This stops the public officials to report acts of 
corruption, because there are no protective measure or clear reporting procedures. 
The solution given by “Uruguay Transparente” is to facilitate the way in which the 
allegations are made, through a web form.  That implementation must be accompanied 
42 https://www.elobservador.com.uy/corrupcion-competencia-politica-y-desarrollo-institucional-n1124547 
43 https://dnic.minterior.gub.uy/index.php/institucional/remuneraciones 
44 https://www.elobservador.com.uy/uruguay-se-apronta-reconocer-una-sus-peores-estadisticas-delitos-dice-direc-
tor-interior-n1245488 
45 Answer given by “Uruguay Transparente” in reply to the questionnaire on provisions of the Inter-American Con-
vention Against Corruption selected for review within the framework of the fifth round,  http://www.oas.org/juridico/
PDFs/mesicic5_ury_soc_civ_ury_tran.pdf 
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with the distribution of all the necessary information the public officials need to know 
about the administrative steps to take after noticing an act of corruption.46
All this said, one of the most effective ways to fight corruption is that of the recom-
mendations 2.3.4 and 2.3.5 of the MESICIC. Creating an impartial department within 
the government, integrated by one representative of each political party, entrusted with 
the task of receiving all the anonymous allegations (through email or phone number) 
and investigate all the cases they consider legitimate with full access to all the public 
departments internal data bases, and have a specialized police force at their disposition 
for those cases in which the whistleblower is considered in danger. 
The best way to protect whistleblowers is if nobody knows who they are. But, in those 
cases where their participation in the investigation is needed or where their identity is 
discovered, the protective measures need to be in place. Only people who feel protected 
are able to blow the whistle and help to make justice.
46 Idem.
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